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UNDERSTANDING CONTEXTUAL “READINESS” FOR ACHIEVING 
INSTITUTIONAL BREAKTHROUGHS: A STUDY OF THE FIGHT AGAINST 
CORRUPTION IN BRAZIL  
 
ABSTRACT 
While there has been increasing attention in institutional theory on how purposeful actors can 
disrupt even deeply entrenched practices, we focus on the role of the context in fuelling these 
efforts. We analyse one of the largest anti-corruption operations ever launched in Brazil: the 'Lava 
Jato' (Car Wash Operation) and its antecedents, the contextual enablers of change and the 
institutional work of agents involved in this operation. We find that the confluence of jolts, 
gradual changes in the field, and the cumulating work of purposeful actors were essential for anti-
corruption actions to gain traction across the country and lead to a breakthrough in the fight 
against corruption. We develop a model to explain how actors seeking institutional change are 
contextually empowered and their efforts yield breakthroughs only at certain points in time when 
the context is “ripe” for change. Our findings contribute both to institutional theory and the 
corruption literature. 
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Corruption is a major global concern and there is widespread interest in finding effective 
ways to fight this problem. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
define corruption as “the abuse of public or private office for personal gain. It includes acts of 
bribery, embezzlement, nepotism or state capture. Corruption is often associated with and 
reinforced by other illegal practices, such as bid rigging, fraud or money laundering” (OECD, 2014). 
Recent corruption scandals have affected organisations as diverse as United Nations Oil (Jeong & 
Weiner, 2012), the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA), and several 
multinationals such as Siemens and Samsung. 
Management theories, and in particular institutional theory, offer a useful lens through 
which to study the fight against corruption, because they are particularly suited to understanding 
institutional change and the deinstitutionalisation of well-entrenched practices (Maguire & Hardy, 
2009). While early neo-institutional formulations focused on notions of conformity and stability 
and the structural constraints upon agency, since at least the 1990s, there has been increasing 
emphasis on explaining agency – both change and maintenance – often through ‘bottom up’ notions 
of institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988), institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006), collective action (Wijen & Ansari, 2007), practices (Smets et al., 2012), framing (Gray, 
Purdy, Ansari, 2015), communication (Loewenstein, Ocasio, & Jones 2012) and social movements 
(Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). While a great deal has been learned about institutional change 
through these studies, in an effort to foreground agency, the ‘agentic turn’ in institutional theory has 
arguably tended to overlook the influence of the institutional context (see exceptions e.g., Weber & 
Glynn, 2006; Gray et al., 2015) that offers varying degrees of latitude to actors involved in 
cultivating change. Contextual influences are often acknowledged but tend to be bracketed as 
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simply as enabling conditions for agentic activities. Even more broadly speaking, organizational 
theories in general – including (neo)institutional theory – tend to ignore the historicity of 
institutional processes and how different historical constituents varyingly influence institutional 
dimensions (Clemente, Durand & Roulet, 2016). precipitating factors or enabling conditions for 
agentic activities.  
Thus, while we have gained impressive insights into actors and their work (Phillips & 
Lawrence, 2012), the role of context in enabling and empowering institutional work remains less 
explored (Lawrence, Lecca, & Zilber, 2013, p. 1026). Yet, it is well established that evolving norms, 
beliefs and other contextual dimensions in society can empower or constrain agents trying to bring 
about change in institutionalised practices by creating “windows of opportunity” that allow these 
changes to be “crashed through” (Aberbach & Christensen, 2001; Granqvist & Gustafsson, 2016). 
Corruption is one example of a highly institutionalised practice, where even concerted efforts 
towards change have often borne little fruit; such as the Malaysian government-backed “Anti-
Corruption No Gift Policy” campaign in 2012 that made few if any inroads into fighting corruption. 
However, it has also been observed that, at certain times, anti-corruption efforts suddenly become 
visible, gain traction and yield breakthroughs. How do these actors at the helm of fighting corruption 
become empowered at particular points in time? 
While existing research has explained how actors can disrupt even deeply entrenched 
practices, we focus on the role of the context in fuelling these efforts. We analyse one of the largest 
anti-corruption operations ever launched in Brazil: the 'Lava Jato' (Car Wash Operation), the 
antecedents that led to it, the contextual enablers of change and some of the agents involved in this 
anti-corruption operation. The Car Wash Operation has been Brazil’s most publicised corruption 
scandal in recent history and led to the arrest of hundreds of politicians and business executives. 
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Many Brazilian agencies have long had anti-corruption missions, but arguably had to wait for 
“contextual readiness” (Ansari & Phillips, 2011, p. 1593), “windows of opportunity” (Aberbach & 
Christensen, 2001) and the availability of societal “raw materials” (Lawrence and Phillips, 2004, p. 
691–692) to push their agenda. The changes we witnessed did not occur in a societal vacuum but 
can be attributed to an accumulation of actors’ efforts and evolving context over time that allowed 
these changes to occur.  
 The paper is structured as follows. First, we review institutional research on corruption and 
then describe and analyse the practice of corruption in the Brazilian context over the last 13 years, 
including the role of the government, anti-corruption agencies and other prominent figures in the 
fight against corruption. We then report key related events – both major and minor jolts – from 
2002-2014. Finally, we present our findings and discuss the implications for the literature of 
corruption and institutional theory. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS  
Institutional Change and the Role of Context 
In the early 1990s, there was a turn in institutional theory to explain agency and institutional 
change including the role of purposeful actors in mobilising resources from the socio-political 
environment and crafting change (DiMaggio, 1988; Seo & Creed 2002). This agentic turn has 
subsequently generated several theoretical lenses to analyse change (Gray et al., 2015) and explain 
how and why purposeful actors contribute to changing enduring institutions (Garud et al., 2007). 
While we have gained a much richer understanding of institutional change from these studies, in 
privileging purposeful actors and their efforts, the role of context in influencing change became 
relatively side lined. 
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To understand change more comprehensively, it is important to analyse the role of the context 
that can reconfigure a field and empower or constrain the actors involved in change (Ansari et al., 
2013; Hoffman, 1999; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Clemente et al., 2017). The role of context has, of 
course, not been ignored. For instance, Hoffman (1999) argues that corporate environmentalism 
emerged and diffused over three decades (1960-92) and led to institutional changes in the US 
chemical industry. Maguire and Hardy (2009) explain the outsider-driven deinstitutionalisation of 
the widespread use of DDT led by discursive changes in the field that undermined the institutional 
pillars supporting the practice. Granqvist & Gustafsson (2016) explain how “windows of 
opportunity” created by ongoing institutional work allowed the successful launch of nationwide 
university reforms in a country in Northern Europe. However, notwithstanding exceptions, many 
studies of purposeful actors and their efforts have tended to largely ignore the role of the context in 
bringing about institutional change (Lawrence et al., 2013). 
While the work done by actors to maintain, disrupt or create institutions (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006, p. 21) is key to understanding institutional change, much empirical research has 
focused on micro-level practices rather than the influence of the macro-level, which offers 
categories and concepts that actors can use to “creatively navigate within their organisational 
fields” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 219). Thus, while agents can challenge established 
organisational structures to implement their vision and change institutional arrangements (e.g. 
DiMaggio 1988), it is not clear why, at times, institutional work seems to matter more, while at 
other times much less so. Here, we focus on a particular type of work – anti-corruption efforts – 
and seek to examine why it fluctuates in its importance in an evolving context. 
Deviant practices and corruption 
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Deviant practices such as corruption often transpire in the shadows amid efforts towards their 
concealment and normalisation to reduce regulatory scrutiny (Gabbioneta, Greenwood, Mazzola, 
Minoja, 2014). There has been renewed interest in the study of deviant and illicit practices by 
management scholars. For example, Greve et al. (2010) examine organisational misconduct and 
its causes, diffusion and consequences. Key deviant practices also include fraud (Gabbioneta et 
al., 2013; Van Debunt, 2010), rogue activities (Land, Loren, & Metelmann, 2014) and corruption 
(Misangyi, et al., 2008). The journal, Organisation Studies, dedicated a special issue to the ‘dark 
side’ of organisations in 2014.  
Corrupt practices have been examined at various levels. Gabbioneta et al. (2014) dealt with 
societal level corruption; Pinto and Leana (2008) focused on individuals and organisations. Ashford 
and Anand (2003) explain how organisational corruption becomes normalised, while Misangyi et 
al. (2008) show how institutional entrepreneurs can change corrupt practices at the societal level. 
While more recent work has focused on the role of history and on the different kinds of corrupt 
practices (Torsello & Venard 2016), there is still a need to better account for the influence of 
contextual factors on corruption and the competing and changing environment demands in different 
settings.  
While this body of work already published has provided rich insights, much of it has been 
at the theoretical level: there is still a dearth of empirical and cross-level work on corruption. The 
predominance of conceptual work can be partly explained by the formidable challenge of collecting 
data on corrupt practices. In addition, few studies have looked at anti-corruption drives, such as the 
social movement in India in 2012 led by Anna Haraze, or government-led initiatives launched 
against corruption in countries such as Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore. These initiatives 
have had varying levels of success in addressing corruption, which raises the question: Why, at 
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times, do anti-corruption drives prove to be influential, while at other times they seem ineffectual? 
Are there critical junctures or particular opportune moments in time, as per the classical Greek 
concept of Kairos, where anti-corruption efforts gain momentum and create breakthroughs? Our 
main questions are thus: (1) Why does anti-corruption work seem to gain more efficacy at certain 
points in time? (2) How do the institutional context and actors influence anti-corruption efforts? 
DATA AND METHODS 
Focusing on corruption investigations and anti-corruption efforts in Brazil during the period 
2002 to 2015, we sought to identify the contextual factors that led to the anticorruption operation in 
Brazil (Car Wash) to generate change in the field. The year 2002 was chosen as a starting point 
because it was the beginning of the Workers’ Party’s tenure in government, the first time an 
opposition party had been elected in recent Brazilian history. We focused on the still ongoing 
operation Car Wash that began in 2014 and concluded our analysis at the end of the main 
parliamentary commission of inquiry. Due to the statutes of limitation in the Brazilian penal code, 
many corrupt activities cannot be investigated pre-2002 as there is no available data. 
We drew on public inquiry data that has been used in previous qualitative studies (e.g. 
Gephart, 1993), as well as transcripts from court proceedings (Gabbioneta et al., 2013). Public 
inquiries are also used by societies as a way of making sense of disasters and to produce in-depth 
accounts involving people that participated in such events (Gephart, 1993). The Car Wash case is 
very well documented, with extensive media articles and government reports, and all the data is 
available via government websites or international online databases. The Petrobras parliamentary 
commission of inquiry, for example, started at the beginning of 2014 and ended in November 2015. 
All sessions were recorded and transcribed; the transcripts are public and available on the website 
of the Brazilian congress.  
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To capture different changes in the field, we also analysed other data sources ranging from 
content analysis of transcripts from government inquiries, laws and court proceedings, to the 
analysis of statistical trends in Brazilian internet usage and published bulletins in main national 
newspapers. To structure our data, we created a chronology of events related to the Car Wash 
operation and conducted detailed coding and visual mapping. We took three steps in our analysis. 
First, we identified key events. We began by organising the raw data and rupture point jolts 
(e.g. the Mensalão case, and protests in 2013 that later led to the 2014 Car Wash operation). We 
sought to track how actors interacted as well as the procedural changes in the Brazilian parliament 
that affected anti-corruption agencies. To capture regulative changes, we studied databases and 
inventories in the legislative and judiciary branches of the Brazilian government. To make sure we 
identified relevant laws in the anti-corruption fight, we also consulted Brazilian legal experts, 
including two law professors at Brazilian law schools and a state attorney (cf., Gabbioneta et al., 
2013). We also conducted a thorough analysis of the Brazilian legislation regarding the anti-
corruption laws and investigative methods of anti-corruption organisations. 
Second, we analysed news coverage of anti-corruption efforts in major Brazilian newspapers 
covering a period of 35 years. We also used the Manchetometro database from the Federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro to track the main Brazilian outlets. More data was found on websites 
and communiqués of government investigative agencies. Finally, we drew on polls by Folha de Sao 
Paulo, a reputable polling company, to analyse the evolution of societal interest in corruption.  
Academic publications and their evolution are useful sources for identifying socio-cognitive 
changes across a field (Hoffman, 1999; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). We accessed the Brazilian 
Ministry of Education databases of scientific articles and dissertations (Brazilian government 
records provide free access to all Master’s and PhD dissertations published in the country). We also 
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studied the international Master’s and PhD database (Proquest) of dissertations in English speaking 
countries. Finally, we analysed the JSTOR database focusing on corruption articles published in 
French, Italian, German and Portuguese.  
Through the triangulation of data from different sources (Gephart, 1988), we developed a 
narrative account and constructed an event history. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
RESEARCH CONTEXT  
Government and the Anti-Corruption Agencies in Brazil  
The Brazilian government and the anti-corruption agencies are part of a large bureaucracy 
composed of civil servants and a top leadership appointed by politicians. It is divided into three 
main branches: Judiciary, Legislative and Executive. The federal headquarters are in Brazil and the 
members of the legislative powers are elected every four years. The president can be re-elected only 
once, whereas senators and federal deputies have unlimited terms. Brazil has one of the most 
expensive elections in the world for which campaigns are mostly paid for by private donations. This 
has also led to several cases of illegal financing and lobbying activities. The coalition of parties in 
the government appoints ministers. The opposition parties in Brazil are independent and have 
formed a strong opposition to the government, particularly over the last 13 years. While the 
opposition used the economic crisis and corruption scandals to attack the government, several top 
members of the opposition parties are also involved and have been linked to the Car Wash operation. 
Civil servants in general are highly paid and their admission exam is one of the most 
competitive recruiting processes in the country. Usually, they retire on the job and can only be fired 
in cases of extreme negligence. This creates a very stable group of civil servants. The ministers of 
the government are appointed by the government and the ruling coalition is either aided by assistants 
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or the civil service corps. The fact that the ministers and heads of all agencies are appointed by the 
ruling government has made the system quite impervious to anti-corruption fighters. 
In Brazil, there are six state organisations with similar roles in investigating corruption. 
These different agencies and structures with different degrees of centrality have been trying to 
coordinate their actions for years. In the past, there has been a different level of coordination among 
the types of organisations, from central agencies such as the Ministerio Publico Federal (MPF) to 
peripheral examples such as the Conselho de Controle de Atividade Financeiras (COAF), The 
Tribunal de Contas da Uniao (TCU), or the Court of National Accounts, which controls the expenses 
and accounts of the government and its voting members. The Court is composed of councillors– 
many retired politicians – appointed by the government and confirmed by the assembly for lifetime 
appointment. It was only in 2001 that the Controller General of the Union, an internal auditing body 
for the government, was created alongside another special ministry for internal audit. Its task is to 
investigate fraud, corruption, internal control and public audits – tasks that up to 2001 had been 
given exclusively to the judiciary and police forces. From 2013 until 2015, the national government 
was politically weakened after a close re-election of Dilma Roussef, concerted opposition in the 
national congress and an economic recession. This gave anti-corruption agencies further autonomy 
from the Workers’ Party. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
FINDINGS 
Sequence of Events 
We report the contextual changes, both key events and gradual changes, in the field related to the 
anti-corruption operation. We begin by analysing the main operation, Car Wash and other jolts, then 
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describe more gradual changes, and finally report the ongoing and cumulative work of various 
agents in the field.  
Jolts in the Field 
Key Outcome – The Car Wash Operation  
The Car Wash corruption investigation began into a small local police investigation involving gas 
stations suspected of money-laundering, hence the original name Lava Jato (Car Wash). The 
investigations began in March 2014 and uncovered a money-laundering scheme of an 
unprecedented scale involving Petrobras, an energy company controlled by the Brazilian state, its 
suppliers and several political parties. Petrobras is one of the most prominent companies in Brazil 
with a very high status, visibility, and strong links to the government. While it has undergone 
significant changes in the last two decades, the government was able to maintain control of its board 
and top management, and members are still directly appointed by the government and its coalition 
partners. 
Initially, Alberto Youssef was the focus of the investigation. He began his career as a 
smuggler of electronic goods from Paraguay before becoming a ‘money changer’ (doleiro); an 
illegal currency trader working for the shadow money remittance system. As the investigations 
progressed, Paulo Roberto Costa, Petrobras’s former Director of Supply, was arrested for alleged 
irregularities in the purchase of the Pasadena refinery in Texas in 2006. After the arrest, a number 
of links were revealed among the money changer, the former director of Petrobras, contractors and 
politicians. Both Costa and Youssef eventually signed the federal prosecutor’s plea agreements to 
explain the schema details and in return received a penalty reduction. In his testimony, a former 
Petrobras director said that the corruption scheme using contractors of Petrobras supplied money to 
the main government parties. This meant that through mapping Youssef’s contacts and his money 
 13 
laundering, investigators uncovered a wider network. This network of potential criminals under 
investigation grew exponentially involving several bodies of the government. 
In November 2014, the federal police initiated a new phase in the Car Wash operation, which 
involved investigations of the largest construction companies in Brazil, including Camargo Corrêa, 
OAS, Odebrecht and seven others. The Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) justice authorised the 
investigations of 50 politicians from six parties: PT, PSDB, PMDB, PP, SD and PTB. The 
investigated list included the President of the Senate, Renan Calheiros (PMDB), and the President 
of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB). In the same period, Petrobras's CEO, Grace 
Foster, and five other directors were fired by President Roussef. The operation is ongoing and there 
have been several new phases since. By the end of our research period in 2015, more than 100 
people had been arrested and companies had paid billions of Brazilian reals (R$) in fines.  
Jolt 1: Mensalão-2005-2006 
The Mensalão was an investigation into a corruption scheme launched between 2005 and 
2006, involving top Workers’ Party officials in Lula’s government and six allied parties. It was the 
main corruption investigation under President Lula’s government, which also included 
investigations into the National Lottery and the Post Office. The corrupt scheme consisted of 
distributing a ‘monthly allowance’ (Mensalão) to the allied parties in order to be able to vote for 
government laws. There was widespread media coverage and this was a huge scandal just a year 
before the national elections of 2006. 
The scandal started when a magazine in Brazil called Veja posted a video of the director of 
the Post Office asking for a bribe from a supplier. Although he personally was asking for the bribe, 
he mentioned that the head of one of the coalition parties PTB, Roberto Jefferson, was heading the 
corruption scheme inside the Post Office. The federal prosecution opened an investigation against 
 14 
several politicians based on this video. In his initial defence, Jefferson denied any involvement in 
the crime, but later, in the parliamentary commission of the inquiry and in newspapers, he decided 
to accuse the government and Minister Dirceu, whom he believed had set him up. By the end of 
2005, both Jefferson and Dirceu lost their parliamentary mandate when they were voted out by their 
peers. In 2006, the investigation by the federal prosecution began and in August 2007, the Supreme 
Court began to analyse the case presented by the prosecution.  
In 2008, it was discovered that most of the money being supplied to pay Mensalão was 
transferred by a company controlled by a telecom company in Brazil. Payment was made through 
a complex network of small companies and local banks. It was managed by Valerio, a former 
lobbyist in the state of Minas Gerais government controlled by the main opposition party. Finally, 
in 2012, 38 participants in the scheme were indicted by the Supreme Court, including 18 former 
members of parliament and ministers. Sentences ranged from six to 20 years. Amid extensive media 
coverage, a small number of ministers resigned and several senior civil servants were fired. 
The Mensalão was an emblematic case that created a major stir. It was the first time that 
several top level ministers, members of parliament, middle level companies and lobbyists were 
sentenced while still in power. However, a sense of dissatisfaction remained regarding the anti- 
corruption driver, since most of those sentenced were freed after one to three years.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Jolt 2: National Protests-2013 
In June 2013, protests involving over a million people broke out in hundreds of cities across 
Brazil (IBGE; Folha de Sao Paulo 2013). This was one of the highest levels of public engagement 
in Brazil since the impeachment of President Collor in 1992. It started as a small protest against the 
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rise in bus ticket prices in Sao Paulo, organised by local social movements but grew rapidly along 
with the demands of protesters. The protests focused on topics such as the huge costs of hosting the 
World Cup, and the impunity for the corrupt in the country, among other grievances. 
At the peak of the protests, the national parliament building was occupied by protestors; 
soon after this, the government and parliament decided to address some of the requests. For 
example, a law that was under discussion that would reduce power of the federal prosecutors (PEC 
37) was cancelled; the punishment for crimes of corruption was made more severe; and the voting 
procedures used to expel members of parliament were amended.  
In 2013, the President signed a law increasing the power and use of plea agreements by the 
Federal Prosecution. The plea agreement could be used to increase investigative powers against 
financial crimes, money laundering, narcotics, smuggling and corruption. The plea agreement could 
be negotiated by the anti-corruption investigators with individuals and organisations, so long as they 
admitted their crimes and denounced other collaborators. Once they were proven to be true, this 
evidence could be used to increase the scope of investigation and be used against other corrupt 
members. The collaborating persons or organisations could have their punishment or fines reduced, 
as well as gain access to other benefits. In 2014, the Brazilian companies that were involved in 
corruption abroad could also be criminally prosecuted in Brazil. While the large-scale protests 
seemed uncoordinated, and were not orchestrated by political leadership, they led to important 
changes in the field. 
Jolts in Brazil offered windows of opportunity for anti-corruption actors to push their 
agendas. As mentioned, the Car Wash operation started a year before the national elections and 
involved parties from both government and opposition. However, it was also exploited by the 
opposition as a case of state misadministration. A weakened government and a vacuum of power in 
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the executive branch meant that the government had less power to interfere in the activities of anti-
corruption agencies, which, in turn, resulted in more freedom to push their agenda. Besides these 
jolts, we also identified gradual changes and the ongoing cumulative work of actors in the field. 
Gradual Ongoing Changes – The Work of Media, Government, Judiciary and Academia 
Work of Media: There was an exponential growth in media coverage about corruption in the last 
decade before launch of the main anti-corruption operations. We observed a spike of coverage in 
the FACTIVA database. The main written media outlets, such as the Globo, Estado de Sao Paulo 
and Folha de Sao Paulo featured specific websites that covered the Car Wash operation, and 
provided daily coverage. Furthermore, television coverage in Brazil is vast with 95% of the 
population tuning in, while more than half of the country’s viewers regularly watch the national 
news show Jornal Nacional (IBGE, IBOPE, 2015).  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Graph 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
The media was perceived by the government as the real ‘opposition’ and media 
conglomerates had mostly been hostile to the government during the period 2002-2015 (Lempes 
UFRJ, 2016). News agencies had tried to shape the political campaign during the 2014 election and 
continued to attack the government’s legislative and executive branches, while sparing the judiciary.  
                     --------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
The press coverage of the Car Wash operation has received by far the largest corruption 
coverage in recent Brazilian history. Car Wash’s general popularity was greatly increased during 
the campaign and the whole country became aware of the investigation and some of the main 
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suspects. In 2015, corruption began to be perceived as the most significant problem in Brazil, 
indicating a change of priorities concerning key issues for the Brazilian people.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Graph 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
The Work of Government and Anti-Corruption Officials: Corruption is not a new phenomenon 
in Brazil, a country where an ambiguous relationship has always existed between governments, 
public tenders and companies. However, the Car Wash investigation is seen as a key point of change 
in recent political history. Recurring topics mentioned by government anti-corruption officials’ 
depositions during the period were ‘change’ and ‘evolution’ in government procedures and laws. 
Important modifications in the law occurred in 2006 and 2013 when several anti-corruption bodies 
were empowered. The widespread use of fines to punish corrupt companies (introduced in 2013) 
and of plea agreements (whose power was increased in 2013) are examples of tools used in the Car 
Wash investigation. In addition, an OECD international anti-corruption treaty was also important 
in achieving a critical mass and reinforcing the anti-corruption procedures in Brazil. 
During this period, there were also several changes in legislation, and for agencies such as 
the MPF, the government could no longer directly appoint top management, and had to respect the 
vote of institution members. The federal government, through its executive branch, also tried to 
increase transparency and created the Portal da Transparencia (Transparency online portal), where 
government bids are published online, along with the costs and payments of projects and salaries of 
civil servants. Government agencies had to control and register every financial operation online and 
make it easily accessible. This information provided a huge database of registered transactions that 
were later used by anti-corruption agencies.  
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There used to be a widespread belief that due to complicated court procedures, indicted 
parties could profit from non-compliance to several societal rules. A long judiciary process meant 
that there was an incentive to delay or appeal any decision, leading to frustration on the part of 
investigators. Complexity in law led to ambiguities and accused parties could escape punishment. 
In a parliamentary hearing it was noted: 
With all the opportunities of defence given, the judiciary still postpones the decision and 
says that the right to defence was not fully guaranteed. This is a problem I have always been 
facing. Any punished person or company goes straight to the judiciary and says that they 
were not guaranteed the right to defence, access to investigation, etc. Imagine if we (would) 
open up an investigation without enough material to support the accusation?  
(Former Chief Auditor of the Brazilian Government, 2015) 
Consequently, many criminal investigations ended up in prescriptions, but without 
definitive sentences. Among many high profile corruption cases in which the final decision was 
reversed was the impeachment of Brazil’s former President Collor that was annulled by the Supreme 
Court. A state official involved in monitoring financial transactions stated: 
The job of the Revenue Service is like a lottery: the subject, the defrauder bets against the 
inefficiency of the State, saying: “Look, the State is not going to find me” …If the Revenue 
finds him, everything goes to the courts, in order to condemn him, via Public Prosecution, 
etc. And if the subject pays before the formal accusation, the crime vanishes. So, somehow 
we are encouraging the subject to bet against the inefficiency of the State (Director, Anti 
Money Laundering Unit, Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, 2014). 
 
Another problem in the application of laws was the complexity of coordination, the anti-
corruption agencies themselves and the application of the law. It was stated by the former Chief 
Legal Adviser: 
There is an overexposure of agents doing the same thing. So, to give an idea, in the specific 
case we are talking about, there is the Public Ministry, the General Prosecutor due to the 
responsibility action; there is the Controllership, which also investigates; there is the CADE, 
which investigates the scope of the cartel… and there is the Union Audit Office which acts 
independently from the application of the law.  
(Chief Legal Adviser of the Government, Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, 2015). 
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A series of new laws allowed the sentencing of both individuals and companies and to 
coordinate anti-corruption activities. The courts began to punish corrupt officials and use plea 
agreements to expose networks of corruption. Yet, even this new application of law led to internal 
controversies. One group of investigators favoured plea agreements as a way of exposing company 
secrets; another group criticised their use, arguing that informers are overly protected. However, 
most agreed that although the law has flaws, the new rules were beginning to work. It was favoured 
by Car Wash investigators and several anti-corruption departments, as stated below: 
I think our legislation is crystal clear in terms of people walking on the right path. Now, if a 
person decides to take the wrong path, I do not think the legislation is to blame, the person 
is to blame, and the fact that that person was in jail for 18 years shows that the system works 
(Official from Anti Money Laundering Department of the Brazilian Central Bank, 
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, 2015). 
 
The Work of Judiciary: Legal changes cannot alone explain why the recent operation has been so 
successful on this occasion. There have been previous instances where laws were approved but not 
enforced, or heated debates transpired but did not lead to changes in legislation or judicial tools. In 
our case, the agents involved in investigations decided to actively shape their context. Although 
they were able to investigate and arrest corrupt officials, they also attempted to try to change the 
law and norms in their favour. They openly campaigned to change laws and norms by collecting 
more than two million signatures for their proposals. To put additional pressure, they also created a 
campaign website in an attempt to directly intervene in the legislative process. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Picture 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
The proposal put forward by the MPF suggested an increase in the power of the institution 
and called for the criminalisation and greater punishment of illegal campaign funding. They also 
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proposed the punishment of political parties involved in these activities that are in direct conflict 
with the current members of the elected government. 
As discussed above, the media brought the corruption issue to the fore, and even the 
investigators decided to create websites and publish press releases to communicate their agenda and 
raise awareness. The investigating team held press meetings and sent out press releases claiming 
that this reduced selective leaks by media outlets. The most active institution in using the media 
was the Federal Public Ministry (MPF), the prosecuting team who communicated with the public 
through their website. The MPF website of the Car Wash operation has had more than two million 
views. They also created a Twitter hashtag meaning no corruption − ‘#CORRUPÇÃONÃO!’ thus 
furthering the debate. Other websites run by the government provide details of several other anti-
corruption operations with key insights into the procedures and sentencing.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Amid increased popular support and a change in norms, the investigative institution gained 
renewed confidence that led them to campaign directly to citizens rather than via the traditional 
route such as first via parliament and then the government. This shows that there was little fear 
among investigators of retaliation from the government.  
The Work of Academia: In Brazil, many anti-corruption investigators are part-time 
academics and have postgraduate qualifications. More than half the Supreme Court has lectured in 
Brazilian universities and continue to present at academic seminars. The head judge of the Car Wash 
operation used to be a law professor in the state of Parana. Furthermore, he published an academic 
article in 2004 about the anti-corruption operation Mani Pulite in Italy. These people base their 
decisions on academic jurisprudence and are inspired by recent academic output as precedents for 
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their judicial decisions. Thousands of PhD and Master’s theses are published in Brazil each year; 
they are registered by the Ministry of Education (MEC, 2016) and provide an in-depth insight into 
the evolution of the perception of corruption by authoritative decision makers. We compared this 
work in Brazil to academic publications regarding corruption and deviance in academia in Italy, 
USA, UK, Germany and France. We can see in the graph below, that there has been significant 
growth in the publication of academic articles focusing on corruption. While the average growth of 
Master’s and PhD publications in the period of social science and humanities was 6.5% per year, 
the corruption publications in the same subjects grew on average by 30% per year over the period. 
While in other countries the study of corruption peaked many years ago and has seen a 
relative decrease in corruption related publications, as seen by our graphs. In Brazil there has been 
exponential growth of interest in studying the topic, albeit this is likely to have been influenced by 
both national and international publications. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Graph 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Key Types of Work 
In our analysis, we examined the role of an evolving context in bringing about change in 
deviant institutionalised practices. Changes in context, ongoing work by actors and key events 
shone a light on the problem of institutionalised corruption, while enabling greater societal support 
for changes that were being gradually implemented. By analysing changes in the context, we looked 
at the sources of change (Vaara, Sonenshein, & Boje, 2016) including changes in laws, 
synchronisation amongst staffing of anti-corruption agencies, the media’s amplification of scandals, 
academic research, judicial activism and the leveraging of popular support while seizing 
opportunities after jolts to create momentum for anti-corruption activities.  
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The analysis of ‘messy’ longitudinal data from this extreme case benefited from the “vivid 
events of the disaster itself and the post-disaster response that focused the attention and actions of 
informants. These advantages facilitated uncovering theoretical mechanisms around action, 
attachment, and commitment” (Eisenhardt, Graebner, & Sonenshein, 2016; pg.1118).  We followed 
Pratt (2009), who cautions against force fitting data as per standard templates and data structure 
tables and examined the whole period rather than exclusively drawing on fine grained data which 
would make broader patterns of interdependent actions hard to observe (Feldman, Pentland, 
D’Adderio, & Lazaric, 2016). Ultimately, we derived three main categories of broader patterns of 
anticorruption work over 13 years after a “messy, episodic, and non-linear path to creative insight 
that is hard to describe or even remember” (Eisenhardt, Graebner, & Sonenshein, 2016, pg.1120). 
We describe these below: 
Visibility: The media outlets enhanced the visibility of various jolts in the field during the 
study period. Media coverage, during and after the jolts, was fundamental to a change in the views 
and norms of society regarding corruption. This increased visibility was exploited by anti-
corruption officials such as prosecutors, who developed their own communication strategies and 
created new spaces for raising awareness and changing societal norms from the bottom up. As has 
been observed by others (Hoffman, 1999), increased academic interest and writings on the topic can 
significantly influence the beliefs and norms of society. 
Coordination: Key actors during the period became better at coordinating their anti-
corruption operations. First, there was an acknowledgement that their own behaviour could be both 
a source of, and solution to, the problem (Ansari et al., 2013) and thus no one was “above board.” 
This led to increased transparency of their actions and anti-corruption officials began to address 
some of the previous collective action problems. This collective awareness of their own complicity 
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in shaping the field led to less finger pointing and greater collaborative engagement. Through their 
coordinated efforts, anti-corruption investigators created a positive feedback loop generated by 
scandal, popular support and arrests of prominent wrongdoers once these jolts occurred.  
Regulatory Bricolage: Anti-corruption officials attempted to reduce interpretive ambiguity 
in laws and in the development and use of new judicial tools. The regulatory status quo had 
benefitted corrupt actors in the past almost granting them impunity against prosecution. Several 
new laws began to erode these benefits. While there is a cost to changing well-known laws that have 
already been adapted and tested, several of the changes that occurred during the decade were 
gradually tested that could have facilitated their adoption. An important example is the plea 
agreement; the Car Wash case would have collapsed if its new format had not been approved in 
2013. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this study, we examined how corrupt institutions can be changed when anti-corruption 
agents are able to leverage contextual changes, critical junctures and “opportune moments (Kairos)” 
to push and reinforce their agenda. We found that contextual changes in Brazil influenced the 
efficacy of ongoing anti-corruption actions against institutionalised corruption. These contextual 
changes alongside continual efforts by anti-corruption agents enabled anti-corruption operations to 
become visible and gain traction.  
To answer our first question about why anti-corruption work seems to gain more efficacy at 
certain points in time, we analysed factors that lead to the development of a ripe context for change. 
We then encapsulated these factors into a model. 
------Insert Figure 1 here------ 
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Our model explains how, alongside gradual changes and more significant jolts that may 
transpire in a field, institutional work by purposeful agents to fight a well-entrenched practice can 
yield breakthroughs in efforts to tackle them; however, only at certain moments in time when the 
context is ripe for change. Scholars have explained the role of exogenous jolts that provide 
opportunities to change institutionalised practices (Oliver, 1992) and yield field reconfiguration 
(Hoffman 1999) through shaking up well-established beliefs and behaviours. Yet, not all jolts are 
perceived equally and their salience depends on the work of actors, such as the media, that influence 
how disruptive or important such events become (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). For a visible outcome 
to transpire and create a breakthrough impact, there also needs to be ongoing accumulation of work 
that can create a critical mass or a setting that is ripe for change. At critical junctures, these 
cumulating efforts can pay off and lead to breakthroughs that had previously seemed unlikely. 
The purpose of our model is not to depict a linear or causal explanation of how jolts or 
shocks lead to visible outcomes, but rather to show the importance of context – both gradual ongoing 
changes and major jolts – in empowering purposeful actors striving to bring about change in a field. 
Context is both the medium and the outcome of the actions and events that transpire as has been 
articulated in the structuration perspective (Giddens, 1979; Gray et al., 2015; Hoffman and Ocasio, 
2001), While jolts can shake up a field, they are not unrelated to the gradual changes cumulating 
over time, nor to the ongoing work of actors striving for change in a field. Indeed, jolts may be the 
long-term results of human actions and a series of cumulating changes (such as a financial crisis 
caused by actors flooding the market with junk bonds) but these actions matter more at certain 
points in time than at other times. 
To depict our arguments about how changes in the broader context can empower individuals, 
and make their actions possibly have greater impact in a field, we developed a model (figure 1). As 
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the figure shows, we depict change as either ongoing/gradual or as jolts over time that we define as 
t1, t2 and tf. On figure 1’s left hand side, we show actors’ ongoing cumulating work that we 
identified as visibility, coordination and regulatory bricolage. On figure 1’s right hand side, we 
depict jolts, their possible impact and compare an evolving context, to a receptacle being “filled” 
by the cumulating work of purposeful (in our case anticorruption) agents. Ongoing changes and 
continual work of actors can yield a ripe context or a “full bucket” that is ready for change. 
In our model, if a jolt occurs at time (t1), where the context is not mature, there will likely 
be limited or no visibility even as actors continue to engage in institutional work to change an 
institutionalised practice. The bucket (context) might move but there will likely be no spillage 
(visible impact) despite the ongoing collective work being performed. This does not mean that this 
jolt did not create any impact, but that it was limited and not widely visible. However, if a jolt occurs 
at time (tf) then there will likely be a “splash” with highly visible outcomes.  
In our analysis, we can think of a jolt at time (t1) as the Mensalao event or the 2013 Protest 
that had an impact on the field but without creating high visibility or impact for the work of 
anticorruption agents. In contrast, the Car Wash operation can be seen as a jolt in time (tf), when 
the anti-corruption work resulted in a highly visible impact. To summarize, in a non-ripe setting, 
actors’ work or even jolts may not be able to create an impact. However, in a setting turned ripe by 
cumulating work, gradual changes and jolts in a field, actors’ work is likely to have an impact and 
lead to breakthroughs. Actors’ work thus becomes effective only at critical junctures or certain 
moments in time when windows of opportunity occur. 
To answer our second question about how the context influences anti-corruption efforts, it 
is worth considering the work being pursued by actors in the fields and context in which they are 
embedded. Contexts are not merely taken-for-granted givens (Purdy, et al. 2015 pg. 131) but 
 26 
provide "resources" to purposeful actors seeking change in established arrangements. In our case, 
work by various actors led to changes in established laws, norms and beliefs. For instance, the media 
played an active role in shaping opinions and influencing societal norms that increased both the 
visibility and impact of jolts. Also, a series of jolts (e.g. arrests of prominent individuals), unsettled 
well-entrenched practices and momentum created for the drive against corruption was exemplified 
by the Car Wash operation. Contextual developments can thus empower committed actors whose 
ongoing efforts are able to create an impact only in a “ready” context.  
Implications and Applicability to Other Cases 
A macro structural view of society is valuable when studying change and the breakdown of 
deeply entrenched patterns (Hinings & Tolbert, 2008). Although our analysis drew on one national 
context, our theorising has relevance for many other types of contexts. One can think of various 
industries plagued by deviant practices such as finance, where we have witnessed Enron’s fraud, 
HSBC’s money laundering operations and PPI’s mis-selling of financial products in the United 
Kingdom. These deviant cases, like the Car Wash investigation, received high visibility in national 
and international media and government officials were able to introduce and apply a series of new 
laws (regulatory bricolage) to punish wrongdoers that had previously seemed immune. These laws 
were also the result of changes implemented over time after major jolts such as the 2007 financial 
crisis. These examples show how corruption began to be perceived globally as a grand challenge 
that needed more coordination via multilateral agreements, such as international treaties (OECD, 
2013) and anti-corruption forums (UK, 2016).  
Corruption is one of the world’s major challenges that requires “novel ideas and 
unconventional approaches to tackle their complex and evolving mix of technical and social 
elements” (Eisenhardt, Graebner, & Sonenshein, 2015. 1113). Our findings carry implications 
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regarding how corruption is seen in other social sciences (e.g. economics and political science) that 
often use rational choice theories to study the phenomenon. These rational-choice models tend to 
portray actors connected to corruption as culturally unaffected ‘super agents’ having interests and 
preferences exogenous from their institutional context (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009). 
However, it is clear from our analysis that rational models do not fully account for explaining social 
reality. Changes in context and ongoing work by anti-corruption agents are mutually constitutive in 
the de-institutionalization of entrenched practices. It is only at critical junctures and certain points 
in time that these efforts seem to bear fruit. Our study provides insights into how norms, laws and 
wider beliefs about corruption need to co-evolve in a field before it becomes ready to yield to the 
purposeful work of anti-corruption agents involved in combatting the problem. Without this change 
in context, even highly committed actors fighting corruption may be unable to achieve 
breakthroughs and their efforts may not be able to yield tangible outcomes. 
Contributions 
We contribute to management theory in three ways. First, we highlight the role of context 
that had arguably been side-lined in institutional theory in the bid to explain agency and change. 
Anti-corruption activity is not necessarily run via top-down decisions from the government, nor do 
actors on the ground operate in a social vacuum. Rather, the context and their cumulating effort can 
empower actors engaged in the ongoing deinstitutionalisation of highly entrenched practices to yield 
noteworthy outcomes or breakthroughs at certain points in time. Second, we shed light on ‘dark’ 
institutions and deviant practices – specifically corruption – and explain how deeply entrenched 
practices are disrupted at certain points in time, through the ongoing work of actors enabled by a 
ripe or conducive context. Finally, we contribute to the growing but mostly conceptual work on 
corruption in management theory by conducting a case study in an under-studied context and add 
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to the few, but increasing number of, empirical studies on corruption. Corruption is a multi-faceted 
phenomenon whose understanding requires an investigation of both the micro and macro levels. 
Our multilevel study is one attempt at doing this by concurrently focusing on the role of context 
and the work of anticorruption actors to explain changes in the field of corruption in Brazil. 
CONCLUSION 
We have explored how actors empowered by a co-evolving context can change deviant 
practices. We have analysed 13 years of changes in the anti-corruption drive in Brazil and find key 
episodes that led to disruptive outcomes in the field. We have found that the confluence of jolts, 
gradual changes and the ongoing and cumulative work of actors were essential for anti-corruption 
actions to gain traction across the country and have an impact. These efforts have gone on for 
decades but only in the last few years have we seen major upheavals, significant breakthroughs and 
ground-breaking changes in the field. We have offered detailed insights into the Brazilian anti-
corruption agencies’ fight against corruption and contribute to both institutional theory and the 
literature on corruption. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This paper is not without with the typical limitations of a case study (Eisenhardt, Graebner, 
& Sonenshein, 2016), but we offer several avenues for further research. Questions that can be 
explored include: (1) What is the role of companies in bringing about change in the rules of the 
game that directly influence these companies? (2) How are corrupt practices sustained? (3) How 
does corruption spread from one organisation to the broader field and national contexts? A closer 
look into these issues can help gain insights into how organisations manage corruption and identify 
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some of the resources and cultural tools in different settings around the world that can have tangible 








x Aberbach, J. D., & Christensen, T. (2001). Radical reform in New Zealand: crisis, windows 
of opportunity, and rational actors. Public Administration, 79(2), 403-422. 
x Ansari, S., & Phillips, N. (2011). Text me! New consumer practices and change in 
organisational fields. Organisation Science, 22(6), 1579-1599.  
x Ansari, S.M., Wijen, F. & Gray, B. (2013). Constructing a climate change logic: an 
institutional perspective on the 'tragedy of the commons'. Organisation Science, 24(4), 
1014-1040. 
x Ashforth, B.E., & Anand, V. (2003). The normalisation of corruption in organisations. 
Research in Organisational Behavior, 25, 1-52.  
x Ashforth, B.E., Gioia, D.A., Robinson, S.L., & Treviño, L.K. (2008). Re-viewing 
organisational corruption. Academy of Management Review, 33, 670-684. 
x Battilana, J., & Dorado, S. (2010). Building sustainable hybrid organisations: The case of 
commercial microfinance organisations. Academy of Management Journal, 53(6), 1419-
1440. 
x Battilana, J., & Lee M. (2014). Advancing research on hybrid organizing – Insights from the 
study of social enterprises, Academy of Management Annals, 8, 397-441.  
x Clemente, M., Durand, R. and Roulet, T. (2016) J., The Recursive Nature of Institutional 
Change: An Annales School Perspective, Journal of Management Inquiry, 26 (1): 17-26. 
x DiMaggio, P. J. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. G. Zucker (Ed.), 
Institutional patterns and organisations: Culture and environment (pp. 3-21) Cambridge, 
MA: Ballinger Publishing. 
x DiMaggio, P.J., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism 
and collective rationality in organisational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147-
160. 
x Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management 
Review, 14(4), 532-550. 
x Eisenhardt, K. M., Graebner, M. E., & Sonenshein, S. (2016). Grand challenges and 
inductive methods: Rigor without rigor mortis. Academy of Management Journal, 59(4), 
1113-1123. 
x Feldman, M. S., Pentland, B. T., D'Adderio, L., & Lazaric, N. (2016). Beyond routines as 
things: introduction to the special issue on routine dynamics. Organization Science, 27(3), 
505–513. 
x Gabbioneta, C., Greenwood, R., Mazzola, P., & Minoja, M. (2013). The influence of the 
institutional context on corporate illegality. Accounting, Organisations and Society, 38(6-
7), 484-504. 
x Gabbioneta, C., Prakash, R., & Greenwood, R. (2014). Sustained corporate corruption and 
processes of institutional ascription within professional networks. Journal of Professions 
and Organisation, 1(1), 16-32. 
 31 
x Garud, R., Hardy, C. and Maguire, S. 2007. Institutional Entrepreneurship as Embedded 
Agency: An Introduction to the Special Issue. Organization Studies 27 (7), 957–969. 
x Gephart, R. (1993). The textual approach: Risk and blame in disaster sense making. 
Academy of Management Journal, 36,1465-1514. 
x Gephart, R. P. (1988).  Ethnostatistics: Qualitative foundations for qualitative research. 
Sage, Newbury Park, CA. 
x Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action, structure, and contradiction 
in social analysis (Vol. 241). Univ of California Press. 
x Granqvist, N., & Gustafsson, R. (2016). Temporal Institutional Work. Academy of 
Management Journal, 59, 1009-1035. 
x Gray, B., Purdy, B. & Ansari, S. (2015) From interactions to institutions: microprocesses of 
framing and mechanisms for the structuring of institutional fields. Academy of Management 
Review, 40(1), 115-143.  
x Greenwood, R. & Hinings, C. R. (1996). Understanding radical organisational change: 
Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism. Academy of Management Review, 
21, 1022–1054. 
x Greve, H., Palmer, D., & Pozner, J. (2010). Organisations gone wild: The causes, processes, 
and consequences of organisational misconduct. The Academy of Management Annals. 
4(1). 
x Hinings, C. R. & Tolbert, P. S. (2008). Organizational institutionalism and sociology: A 
reflection [Electronic version]. In H. Gunz & M. Peiperl (Eds.), Handbook of organizational 
institutionalism (pp. 473-490). London: SAGE. 
x Hoffman, A. J. (1999). Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the U.S. 
chemical industry. Academy of Management Journal, 42, 351–371. 
x Hoffman, A. & Ocasio, W. (2001). Not all events are attended equally: Toward a middle-
range theory of industry attention to external events. Organisation Science, 12:4, 414-434. 
x Jeong, Y., & Weiner, R. J. (2012). Who bribes? Evidence from the United Nations' oil-for-
food program. Strategic Management Journal, 33, 1363-1383.  
x Land, C., Loren, S., & Metelmann, J. (2014). Rogue logics: Organisation in the grey 
zone. Organisation Studies, 35(2), 233-253. 
x Lawrence, T. B., Leca, B., & Zilber, T. B. (2013). Institutional work: Current research, new 
directions and overlooked issues. Organisation Studies, 34(8), 1023-1033. 
x Lawrence, T. B., & Suddaby, R. (2006). Institutional work. In S. Clegg, C. Hardy, T. 
Lawrence, W. Nord (Eds.), Handbook of Organisation Studies, (pp. 215-254). London:Sage.  
x Loewenstein, J., Ocasio, W., & Jones, C. (2012). Vocabularies and vocabulary structure: A 
new approach linking categories, practices, and institutions. The Academy of Management 
Annals, 6(1), 41-86. 
x Maguire, S., & Hardy, C., (2009), Discourse and deinstitutionalisation: The decline of DDT. 
Academy of Management Journal, 52(1): 148-178. 
 32 
x Ministerio Publico- Retrieved on December(2015)- http://lavajato.mpf.mp.br 
x Misangyi, V. F., Weaver, G., & Elms, H., (2008). Ending Corruption: The interplay among 
institutional logics, resources, and institutional entrepreneurs. Academy of Management 
Review, 33, 750-770.  
x OECD (1997) Anti Bribery Convention.  This document was taken from a Web site. Retrieved 
January 8, 2015 from: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/ 
x OECD (2009) –Anti Bribery Recommendation- This document was taken from a Web site. 
Retrieved November 15, 2016:  http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/oecdantibriberyrecommendation2009.htm 
x Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management 
Review, 16, 145-179. 
x Oliver, C. (1992). The antecedents of deinstitutionalisation. Organisation Studies, 13(4). 
563-588. 
x Phillips, N., Lawrence, T., & Hardy, C. (2004). Discourse and Institutions. The Academy of 
Management Review, 29(4), 635-652. 
x Pinto, J., Leana, C. R., & Pil, F. K. (2008). Corrupt organisations or organisations of corrupt 
individuals? Two types of organisation-level corruption. Academy of Management 
Review, 33(3), 685-709. 
x Phillips, N., & Lawrence, T. B. (2012). The turn to work in organisation and management 
theory: Some implications for strategic organisation. Strategic Organisation, 10(3), 223-8 
x Pratt, M. G. (2009). From the editors: For the lack of a boilerplate: Tips on writing up (and 
reviewing) qualitative research. Academy of Management Journal, 52(5), 856-862. 
x Powell, W. W., & Colyvas, J. A. (2008). Microfoundations of institutional theory. The Sage 
Handbook of Organisational Institutionalism, 276-298. 
x Powell, W. W. & P. DiMaggio. (1991). The new institutionalism in organisational analysis. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
x Reinmoeller, P and Ansari, S. 2015. Why don't organizations abandon practices that neither 
do good nor look good? A study of the development and persistence of the practice of 
Competitive Intelligence. Forthcoming in British Journal of Management. 
x Schneiberg, M., & Lounsbury, M. (2008). Social movements and institutional analysis. In 
AUTHORS (Ed./Eds). The Handbook of Organisational Institutionalism (pp. 648-670). 
LONDON:SAGE. 
x Seo, M. G., & Creed, W. D. (2002). Institutional contradictions, praxis, and institutional 
change: A dialectical perspective. Academy of Management Review, 27(2), 222-247. 
x Smets, M., Morris, T. I. M., & Greenwood, R. (2012). From practice to field: A multilevel 
model of practice-driven institutional change. Academy of Management Journal, 55(4), 877-
904. 
x Torsello, D. & Venard, B. (2016). The anthropology of corruption. Journal of Management 
Inquiry, 25(1), 34-54 
 33 
x Van De Bunt, H. (2010). Walls of secrecy and silence. Criminology & Public Policy, 9(3), 
435-453. 
x Vaara, E., Sonenshein, S., & Boje, D. (2016). Narratives as sources of stability and change 
in organizations: approaches and directions for future research. The Academy of 
Management Annals, 10(1), 495-560. 
x Weber, K., & Glynn, M. A. (2006). Making sense with institutions: Context, thought and 
action in Karl Weick’s theory. Organization Studies, 27, 1639-1660. 
x Wijen, F., & Ansari, S. (2007). Overcoming inaction through collective institutional 
entrepreneurship: Insights from regime theory. Organisation Studies, 28(7), 1079-1100. 
 
 
 
View publication stats
